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The Biological Weapons Convention deserves real political and financial backing

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In a pre-recorded keynote to the 6th Session of the Working Group on Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, Helen Clark urged urgent action to reinforce the treaty in the face of emerging threats from synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, and gene editing.
 

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Excellencies, colleagues, and friends, 

It is an honour to join you today at the opening of this critical session of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention. I am sorry not to be with you in person.

I speak to you today as a member of The Elders, an organisation founded by Nelson Mandela to promote peace, justice, human rights, and a sustainable planet.  We have long called for stronger multilateralism in the face of escalating global risks. That leads us to support strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, the critical international legal instrument banning the use of biological weapons.

When the Convention came into force fifty years ago, Cold War tensions were dangerously high. Even so, ideological adversaries were able to agree on common norms and safeguards to protect humanity.

 Fast forward to now, the Convention is light on the institutional capacity and sustainable financing needed to meet the demands of the moment.

Rapid advances in synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, and gene editing offer enormous benefits – but without international guardrails, they open the door to catastrophe.

The exponential dissemination of AI tools, and the lack of regulation to prevent their misuse to create a biological weapon, is of real concern.

This year, the Doomsday Clock was set at 89 seconds to midnight – a stark reminder of the converging threats from nuclear weapons and climate breakdown to unregulated technologies. The risks of biological weapons belong firmly in that latter category.

These threats are compounded by the erosion of trust, the flow of disinformation, and growing polarisation. Taken together, these make co-ordinated international action harder just when it is most needed.

We can draw some insights from the painful experience of COVID-19, and the cost of gaps in governance structures, underinvestment in preparedness, and a fragmented approach to biosafety, biosecurity, and pandemic risk. We need to apply these insights to the task of supporting a stronger, better-resourced Biological Weapons Convention.

To that  end, we make three points:

First, the Biological Weapons Convention must be brought into the centre of global health and security governance. Biosafety and biosecurity are not side issues. They are central pillars of pandemic prevention and international security, and must be fully integrated into the global response to future threats.

Second, the Convention must be empowered to keep pace with science. There is still no global mechanism to oversee high-risk pathogen research. There are no binding standards for biosafety enforcement. Yet the potential for accident or abuse is growing. The last Global Health Security Index found that only 25 per cent of countries with advanced laboratories met high biosafety and biosecurity standards. That is a sobering statistic – and a glaring vulnerability.

Third – and perhaps most important for this session – the Convention’s institutional foundation must be reinforced. It still lacks an independent verification mechanism, sustainable funding, and dedicated technical capacity. States must move beyond rhetorical support and commit the resources, staffing, and political and financial capital needed to make this treaty fit for purpose in the 21st century.

Today’s fragmented geopolitical context is indeed challenging. But the history of the Biological Weapons Convention shows that progress is still possible even in periods of tension – if leaders are willing to rise above short-term interests and act for the common good.

This is a time for action. The decisions made during this session – and in the lead-up to the 2027 Review Conference – will shape our ability to prevent a biological catastrophe for decades to come.

It is not a question of if – but when – a malicious actor will attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities. Governments have a rare opportunity to strengthen the only multilateral forum which holistically addresses the biological weapons threat. The Biological Weapons Convention therefore deserves not just rhetorical support, but real political and financial backing.

Let us not look back and say, “Had we known.” We do know. And we have the tools to do better – but only if we choose to act boldly, collectively, and now.

The Elders support all of you who are working to uphold and strengthen this vital Convention. Future generations will not judge us on the threats we faced. They will judge us on how we responded

Thank you.

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